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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3981 
__________ 
 
WEIH STEVE CHANG, individually and as guardian for A.B., C.D., and E.F.; A.B. a 
minor child; C.D., a minor child; E.F., a minor child,  
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, 
AND THEIR FAMILIES, DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, SARAH MARLOWE, 
individually and in her official capacity; BAHU GILLIAM, individually and in her 
official capacity; CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY CENTER OF DELAWARE, CITY OF 
WILMINGTON, a municipal corporation of the State of Delaware; CITY OF 
WILMINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; MARY QUINN, individually and in her 
official capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-00963) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: October 4, 2019)
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___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Weih Steve Chang, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss his 
amended complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 Chang and his three minor children, through counsel, filed suit against the State of 
Delaware, Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families, Division of 
Family Services (“DFS”) and two employees thereof, the City of Wilmington, the City of 
Wilmington Police Department, Officer Mary Quinn, and the Children’s Advocacy 
Center of Delaware.  The amended complaint, which is related to a custody case in 
Delaware Family Court, alleges that Chang reported incidents of abuse and neglect by the 
children’s mother to DFS and the Wilmington Police Department.  Officer Quinn 
interviewed Chang and the children’s mother, observed a Children’s Advocacy Center 
employee interview the children, and prepared reports.   
Chang and his children aver that DFS determined that Chang had told the children 
to make false allegations against their mother and filed a petition against him in Family 
Court alleging emotional abuse or neglect.  The Family Court found that the evidence did 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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not support the petition and dismissed the matter.  An order attached to the original 
complaint reflects that the Family Court noted that the incidents, which had occurred 
years earlier, were true, but that Chang’s motive for reporting them just before a custody 
transfer was suspect. 
Chang and his children claimed violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1983 and state law based on these proceedings and the alleged continued denial of 
custody to Chang.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the 
amended complaint and this appeal followed.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is 
plenary.  Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017).  Chang raises three 
issues for our review. 
Chang first contends that the District Court erred in dismissing a breach of 
contract claim.  The amended complaint alleges that the Children’s Advocacy Center, the 
Wilmington Police Department, the Delaware Department of Justice, and the State of 
Delaware were parties to a Memorandum of Understanding that addressed the 
investigation of child abuse allegations and services for victims.  The amended complaint 
avers that the defendants breached this contract by failing to perform their obligations 
thereunder and thereby injured the children, who are allegedly third-party beneficiaries of 
the contract.  In dismissing this claim, the District Court ruled that the Memorandum of 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
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Understanding is a set of guidelines, not a contract, and that it reflects no intent to 
compensate the public for any failure to perform. 
Appellees argue that Chang lacks standing to challenge the dismissal of this claim 
because it was asserted by his children, who are not parties to the present appeal.  We 
agree.  The amended complaint alleges that the children are the third-party beneficiaries 
of the Memorandum of Understanding and that they were injured by its breach.  Chang 
was notified that he may not pursue claims on behalf of his children in this appeal.  See 
Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991).  His 
arguments that the District Court erred is dismissing this claim are not properly before us. 
Chang also contends that the District Court erred in relying on an out-of-court 
custody agreement in dismissing his civil rights claims.  Although his argument is not 
entirely clear, Chang appears to take issue with the District Court’s reliance on a Family 
Court order reflecting that he agreed to transfer full custody to the children’s mother in 
support of its dismissal of his substantive due process claim against Officer Quinn.  The 
District Court ruled that Officer Quinn was entitled to qualified immunity in part because 
the amended complaint did not suggest that her involvement caused a denial of a 
constitutional right where Chang had consented to the mother’s custody of the children 
before the investigation.  
Chang argues that he did not relinquish his constitutional rights by agreeing to 
transfer custody to the children’s mother.  He states that he had custody initially and that 
custody orders can be modified at any time.  Chang’s agreement to transfer custody 
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before the investigation may not preclude his constitutional claim insofar as he alleges 
the continued denial of custody, but Officer Quinn is entitled to qualified immunity 
because Chang does not sufficiently allege a violation of his substantive due process 
rights.  See Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (setting forth inquiry 
for resolving questions of qualified immunity). 
The amended complaint alleges that Officer Quinn interfered with Chang’s 
parental rights by improperly allowing the children’s mother’s friend to assist her in her 
interview, failing to investigate the claims further, and initiating or causing the initiation 
of proceedings against him knowing that the children’s mother had admitted to acts of 
abuse in her interview.  The amended complaint also avers that Officer Quinn issued a 
report that concluded without reasonable basis that Chang had told the children to lie.  As 
recognized by the District Court, the right to familial integrity does not include the right 
to remain free from child abuse investigations.  Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children and 
Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997).  Chang’s allegations are insufficient to 
state a plausible claim that Officer Quinn violated his substantive due process rights.  See 
Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining conduct must 
be so ill-conceived or malicious that it “shocks the conscience”).1 
                                              
1To the extent Chang disputes the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claim based on 
his custody agreement, as discussed below that claim was properly dismissed for other 
reasons.  To the extent Chang disputes the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claim 
against DFS employee Sarah Marlowe, he does not challenge the primary ruling below 
that she is entitled to absolute immunity and it is thus unnecessary to address the District 
Court’s other reasons for dismissing his claim. 
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Finally, Chang contends that the District Court erred in considering documents 
outside the pleadings in granting the motions to dismiss.  We read his brief as asserting 
that the District Court erred in relying on such documents in finding probable cause and 
dismissing his malicious prosecution claim against Officer Quinn.  In adjudicating this 
claim, the District Court referred to the City of Wilmington’s brief, which relied upon 
Officer Quinn’s police report and the transcripts of the family’s interviews that were 
submitted in support of the motion to dismiss.  The District Court ruled that it could 
consider these documents without converting the motion to a summary judgment motion. 
 We need not resolve this issue because, even if we were to agree with Chang that 
the District Court erred in considering these documents without converting the motion, 
dismissal of his malicious prosecution claim was warranted on other grounds.  In support 
of his claim, Chang averred that he “suffered a deprivation of his due process right to 
liberty, the right to the integrity of his family and the fellowship of his children.”  Am. 
Compl. at 21.  To the extent he relies on a violation of his right to substantive due 
process, as the City defendants asserted below, such a violation cannot provide the basis 
for a malicious prosecution claim.  Merkle v. Upper Dublin School District, 211 F.3d 
782, 792 (3d Cir. 2000).  Chang also argued below that he stated a claim because he was 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he was required to defend the 
child abuse charges.  However, to the extent his malicious prosecution claim can be based 
upon the civil proceeding brought against him, there was no seizure absent pretrial 
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custody or onerous pretrial restrictions, which have not been alleged here.  DiBella v. 
Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2   
                                              
2Chang’s motion for leave to add the proposed theory of white privileges on appeal is 
denied as the theory was not presented in District Court prior to the judgment.  The City 
of Wilmington and other City Appellees’ motion to seal their appendix is granted.  
Chang’s motion to use his children’s full names is denied.  Chang’s motion to stay his 
appeal is also denied. 
